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Abstract 
Much has been written about the relationship between economic growth and 
aggregate inequality in recent years. In this paper we extend this literature by 
examining whether economic growth affects, not the level, but rather the nature of 
inequality. To do this we focus on the Irish economy which experienced a remarkable 
boom starting in 1994. We analyse the covariance structure of earnings in Ireland to 
examine whether this rapid growth affected earnings dynamics over the period. Using 
panel data for the years 1994-2001, we show that, while permanent inequality in 
Ireland is high, the degree of persistence of inequality was not significantly affected 
by the rapid growth in the economy. 
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 1. Introduction 
Much has been written on the relationship between growth and aggregate inequality. 
The Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets 1955), for example, suggests that inequality 
increases over the initial stages of development as the economy moves from 
agricultural to industrial, but then falls as the labour force in industry expands. More 
recently there has been a large literature on the impact of technological progress on 
inequality.2 However, for the most part the empirical literature (e.g. Easterly (1999), 
Dollar and Kray (2002)) has been unable to find a significant effect of growth on 
inequality. 
However, all of this literature has focused on aggregate measures of 
inequality. A growing literature has emerged in recent years which aims to  
decompose overall inequality into two distinct components: inequality that reflects 
differences across individuals or groups that are due to permanent characteristics (so 
called ‘permanent’ inequality) and inequality arising from temporary shocks, which 
cause disadvantage at a point in time but have limited persistence over time 
(‘transitory’ inequality).  
The motivation for these decompositions was to develop a better 
understanding of the growth in earnings inequality experienced by many countries in 
recent decades. Some explanations of this growth have focussed on the apparently 
pervasive increases in the returns to education, argued to be due to skill-biased 
technological change or increasing international trade;3 explanations of this type 
would suggest the growth of permanent inequality. Other analyses have emphasized 
                                                 
2 For a recent discussion of the relationship between technological progress and inequality see 
Iacopetta (2005). 
3 For a discussion of returns to education in Ireland, see Barrett et al. (2002). 
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increasing lifetime earnings instability for given individuals, perhaps due to an 
increasing susceptibility of earnings to the competitive pressures faced by firms. To 
the extent that increased lifetime inequality translates into an increased variance of 
earnings at any given point in time, this would increase overall inequality.  
The matter of which of these two components of inequality has been 
responsible for increasing the overall level of inequality also has important policy 
implications. A high or increasing role for permanent inequality requires a reduction 
in the dispersion of permanent characteristics, such as education levels, if inequality is 
to be reduced. On the other hand, if transitory inequality is primarily responsible for 
increasing inequality, then an emphasis on skills will have little effect, and attention 
might be more usefully paid to other features of the labour market, such as 
employment protection legislation. In fact, most studies have found that both 
permanent and transitory components have contributed to growing inequality (cf. 
Gottschalk and Moffit (1995) and Haider (2001) for the US; Kalwij and Alessie 
(2007), Dickens (2000) and Ramos (2003) for the UK; Gustavsson (2007) for 
Sweden; Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada). 
In this paper we extend the earlier work that looks at the impact of growth on 
inequality by examining, not whether growth affects the level of aggregate inequality, 
but rather whether it affects the underlying nature of inequality. To do this we 
examine the evolution of inequality in Ireland over the years 1994-2001. The Irish 
case is of interest because of the transformation that occurred over this period. 1994 
saw the start of a remarkable economic boom, with average annual GDP growth rates 
of 8.5%. The impact on unemployment rates is shown in Figure 1. Unemployment fell 
from 14.7% to 3.6% between 1994 and 2001. Unemployment had not fallen below 
12.9% in the previous decade and stabilised after 2001, making our choice of sample 
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period particularly relevant. Employment growth was even more striking, with total 
employment rising by 41% during that time, fuelled by increasing participation rates, 
particularly for women, but also by high net positive inward migration for the first 
time in the country’s history. There is also evidence that job mobility increased 
significantly during the period: Bergin (2008, Table 3) reports that the number of 
workers changing jobs in the previous year increased from 5.7% in 1995 to 10.2% in 
2001. 
With such a striking increase in labour market activity, it might be expected 
that fundamental changes in the functioning of the labour market also took place. For 
example, market forces might be expected to be stronger in a tight labour market, 
inducing firms to change their wage-setting mechanisms. Workers, too, might 
encounter more frequent opportunities for changing their situations. Thus, it might be 
expected that a boom of this length and intensity would increase the importance of the 
transitory component of inequality. Establishing whether the changing labour market 
did indeed have an effect on the nature of inequality in Ireland is the primary focus of 
this paper. 
A secondary focus of the paper concerns the proportion of inequality that is 
permanent. Daly and Valetta (2007) provide tentative evidence of an inverse 
relationship between the level of overall inequality and the proportion of that 
inequality that is permanent. They decompose inequality in Germany, the US and the 
UK into its permanent and transitory components and find that the permanent 
component is lower in the US (an average of 53.6%) and the UK (average 51.2%) – 
where overall inequality in higher – than in Germany (average 57.8%).4 This accords 
with the view that high inequality countries are also countries of high mobility, with 
                                                 
4 Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006), using a different methodology, also find that the impact of reranking, 
which is a feature of transitory shocks, was much larger in the US in the 1980’s than in Germany, 
leading to a greater increase in inequality in the US. 
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the implication that a lower proportion of overall inequality is permanent in these 
countries. The analysis of Irish data can provide another data point in assessing the 
validity of this suggestion. The level of inequality in Ireland is high by international 
standards and is similar to that in the US and the UK, rather than continental or 
northern Europe. For example, Nolan (2000, Table 6.2) gives the Irish 90/10 earnings 
ratio in 1994 as 4.06; this compares with 4.35 in the US, 3.31 in the UK, 3.28 in 
France, 2.32 in Germany and 2.13 in Sweden; of the sixteen countries listed in the 
table, only the US has higher earnings dispersion. 
To address these issues, we decompose inequality in Ireland into its permanent 
and transitory components, using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
data, which is available from 1994 to 2001. We consider the proportion of total 
inequality accounted for by the permanent component and look for any evidence of a 
trend in this component over this period. 
The methodology is outlined in Section 2; the data are discussed in Section 3; 
results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 reports the results for the extension of the 
analysis to public and private sector earnings and our conclusions are presented in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Methodology 
To model earnings over the life-cycle we write log-earnings as a function of labour-
market experience, itX and a residual, yit : 
( , )it it t itLog Y g X yδ= +     (1) 
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In addition we assume that the residual component, yit, can be written as the sum of a 
permanent component, iα , due for example to fixed characteristics such as the level 
of education, and a transitory one, , reflecting temporary shocks that affect the 
individual or the labour market. That is  
itv
    it i ity vα= +       (2) 
where iα  and  are random variables with mean zero and variances itv 2ασ  and 2vtσ  
respectively. Our objective is to identify the separate roles played by the permanent 
and transitory shocks in determining inequality. To do this we first estimate yit by 
calculating the residuals from OLS regressions of equation (1).5 These residuals are 
then used to model the covariance structure described by equation (2). Modelling the 
dynamics of earnings through the residual term allows us to abstract from any 
common growth trends or life-cycle effects.  
We use two approaches to estimate the relative contributions of permanent and 
transitory shocks. The first approach, which we loosely describe as the ‘non-
parametric’ approach, uses data from two time periods t and s, that are sufficiently far 
apart that . In this case the variance of the permanent component is 
identified from the covariance of earnings, = 
( , ) 0it isCov v v =
( , )it isCov y y
2
ασ , and the proportion of 
total inequality that is permanent is given by  
 ( , )
( )
it is
it
Cov y y
Var y
 (3) 
However, this approach relies on some arbitrary assumptions about the 
evolution of individual earnings. In particular, it assumes that that the returns to 
permanent characteristics accounted for by iα  are constant over time and also that the 
                                                 
5 In the empirical application g is a simple quadratic in experience. 
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persistence of transitory shocks is of an order no higher than s t− . To examine the 
robustness of our findings to these assumptions, we also consider an alternative 
approach that models these features explicitly using a parametric model of earnings 
dynamics.  
In the parametric model, we write yit as:  
 it t i t ity p vα λ+  (4) =
where tp and tλ  are factor loadings that allow the permanent and temporary variances 
of earnings respectively to change over time. To allow for  persistence in the 
transitory shocks, we specify a model for . We considered a number of alternatives 
processes but the preferred specification is based on the assumption that  follows an 
ARMA (1,1) process, that is  
itv
itv
1 1it it it itv vρ θε ε− −= + + .    (5) 
where the itε  are i.i.d. random error terms with mean zero and variance 2εσ . In the 
model given by (4) and (5), and with eight years of data (described below), there are 
19 parameters to estimate ( 2ασ , ρ, 2 8λ λ− , 2 8p p− , 20vσ , 2εσ , θ)6. We denote this 
parameter vector by γ . We estimate these parameters using a Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator. Intuitively, this entails choosing the parameters of the 
model so that the moments of the theoretical model outlined in (4) and (5) are 
matched as closely as possible to their empirical counterparts. 
To do this, the residuals, ity , are used to calculate the empirical variance-
covariance matrix for the eight years, .  The corresponding population variance-Cˆ
                                                 
6 For identification, we normalise λ  and p  to 1.1 1
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covariance matrix is denoted by C. In (4) and (5) above, the variance-covariance 
matrix ( )C f γ=  has the typical diagonal element: 
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
0
0
( ) ( )
t
t w
t t t v
w
Var y p Kασ λ ρ σ ρ
−
=
= + + ∑  
and typical off-diagonal element,  
1
2 2 2 2
,
0
( ) (
t
t s w
t t s t t s t t s vo
w
Cov y y p p K 2 )α εσ λ λ ρ σ ρ ρ θσ
−+
+ + +
=
= + + +∑ , 
where 2 2(1 2 )εσ θ ρθ= + +K .  
Once ( )C f γ=  has been specified, the parameter vector γˆ is then chosen to 
minimize 'ˆ ˆˆ( ( )) ( (C f W C f ˆ))γ γ− − , where W is a weighting matrix (Chamberlain, 
1984). Following Altonji and Segal (1996), we set W equal to the identity matrix, I. In 
our model there are 19 parameters to estimate and 36 ( ( 1) 2+T T ) unique moment 
conditions. Because of the nature of the panel data used, the calculation of standard 
errors is not straightforward; we followed the procedure outlined in Appendix A of 
Haider (2001) and in Haider (2000).7
 
3. Data 
The data used in the analysis are the eight waves of Irish data in the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP), which contains data on 14 EU countries. 
These are the only panel data with appropriate earnings variables available for 
Ireland. The years covered by the survey are 1994-2001.  
                                                 
7 We are grateful to Steve Haider for providing a copy of the unpublished 2000 paper. 
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In the Irish data, the initial sample size in 1994 was 9,904 individuals; falling 
to 4,023 in 2001.8 The sample chosen for the present study is comprised of men aged 
21-65 whose labour market behaviour does not indicate characteristics likely to be 
associated with erratic earnings. Thus, anyone who experiences unemployment or 
time out of the labour market on ‘home duties’ at any stage during the sample period 
is omitted from the sample altogether. Anyone not reporting earnings in any year for 
which he was employed is also dropped from the sample, as is anyone with earnings 
data missing due to attrition. This use of a balanced panel follows the approach taken 
in Haider (2001), Baker and Solon (2003), Baker (1997), Daly and Valetta (2007) and 
Gustavsson (2007). 
Considering a balanced panel of males allows us to assess the effect of the 
boom on the nature of the labour market only, and to abstract from any changes in the 
composition of the labour force. Given that unemployment dropped significantly 
during the sample period after a long period of very high unemployment, and 
particularly when it is considered that in 1994, 65% of unemployed men were long-
term unemployed, it is very likely that the characteristics – both observed and 
unobserved – of those who re-joined the labour market as the boom progressed were 
very different to those who had been working all along. Similarly, the participation 
rate of women rose from 39% to 47.5% during the period, with composition effects 
likely if women who entered the labour market after many years of absence were 
included. 
The effect of the changes in the composition of the labour force on inequality 
in Ireland is a very interesting topic, and is one that will be addressed in future work, 
                                                 
8 This reflects substantial sample attrition in the Irish data but Watson (2003) concludes that although 
there are some correlations between attrition and economic variables, such correlation explains only a 
very small part of the attrition. 
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but for now, we wish to focus on any changes in the way the labour market operates, 
rather than conflating these changes with changes in the workforce. 
The sample is not, however, a fully balanced panel, but rather a ‘revolving’ 
balanced panel. Individuals are allowed to be in the sample for some years but not for 
others if their absence is due to retirement, being in full-time education, or failure to 
meet the age restriction. The assumption here is that retirement or schooling are not 
indicative of either stability or instability in labour market attachment. Of course, 
younger workers are known to have more earnings instability than older workers, but 
this appears to be due to time taken to find a good job match rather than lack of labour 
market attachment. 
Outliers, defined as earnings in the top or bottom 1% of the sample 
distribution, are also excluded. Finally, the sample was restricted to those who had at 
least two years of observed earnings in the sample, in order to reduce the difference 
between the samples used to calculate the variances and those used to calculate the 
autocovariances.  
In order to illustrate the effects of these various sample selection rules on 
measured inequality, as well as to give a picture of overall inequality in Ireland during 
the sample period, Figure 2 shows the coefficient of variation of earnings for men 
aged 21-65 before and after the sample selection rules were applied. It also shows, for 
completeness, the variance of the residuals calculated from Equation (1). It can be 
seen that the pattern of inequality, as measured by the coefficient of variation of gross 
earnings, is similar in the two samples, but that both falls and rises are more muted in 
the revolving balanced panel sample.  
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4. Results 
For each year of data, current monthly log gross earnings are regressed on potential 
experience and its square, as described above, and the residuals saved. The variance-
covariance matrix of these residuals is reported in Table 1. Looking along the 
diagonal, we observe that despite the rapid growth in the economy over the period, the 
variance is relatively stable over the period, ranging from a high of 0.217 in 1994 to a 
low of 0.173 in 1996. Looking down each column, the autocovariances decline over 
time, with the most significant decline at the first order; after the first period, there is a 
smooth, but very gradual decline. A similar pattern has been found by many other 
authors, including, for example, Daly and Valetta (2007), for the US, Germany and 
the UK; Haider (2001) for the US; Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada; and 
Gustavsson (2004) for Sweden.  
As a preliminary estimate of the proportion of inequality that is due to 
permanent factors, we use the non-parametric estimate given by (2) above. Following 
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002), we choose covariances that are five years apart to 
estimate ( )iVar α . Given the short panel available, the required covariances can only 
be calculated for three pairs of years (1994/1999, 1995/2000 and 1996/2001). These 
indicate that in 1994, the permanent component of inequality was 67% of the total; in 
1995, the figure was 69% and in 1996, permanent inequality was 77% of the total. 
These figures are suggestive of a rise in permanent inequality, but with estimates for 
only three years available, no significance can be read into the trend. Our results are 
not directly comparable with many other studies because of differences in the time 
periods used. However Daly and Valetta (2007) use data for the 1990s. Using their 
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variance-covariance matrix,9 the non-parametric estimate indicates that the permanent 
component lies between 48% and 53% for Great Britain, with values for West 
Germany ranging between 56% and 70% and for the US between 60% and 67%, all 
for the early 1990s. Thus we see that the Irish values are at the upper range of 
estimates found for other countries. 
To examine the nature of Irish inequality in more detail, we estimate the 
parametric model outlined in Section 2. These results are presented in Table 2. ρ, the 
parameter indicating the degree of persistence of transitory shocks, is estimated to be 
0.64, and θ is estimated to be –0.23, which reduces the magnitude of the first order 
correlations. The results show no clear pattern in either the tλ , the factor loadings on 
the transitory shocks, or in the tp , the factor loadings on the permanent 
characteristics. None of these is individually significantly different from one at the 
5% confidence level, and Wald tests also fail to reject the hypotheses that the tp 's are 
jointly equal to one, or that the tλ 's are jointly equal to one, so there is no evidence of 
any trend. We return to this issue in the next section. 
The parameter estimates can also be used to calculate permanent inequality, 
transitory inequality and predicted total inequality. The decomposition results are 
presented in Table 3 and graphed in Figure 3. Looking at the first two columns of 
Table 3, we see that the model does well in predicting the actual total variance. Of 
more interest is the relative importance of the transitory and permanent components in 
total inequality, which is given in the last column of the table. At the beginning of the 
period, permanent inequality accounted for approximately 63% of total earnings 
                                                 
9 We are grateful to Robert Valetta for providing us with the unpublished variance-covariance matrix 
used in the Daly and Valetta study. 
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inequality. In subsequent years, it rose to about 77% (1997). The average over the 
whole period is about 71%. It is striking how similar these estimates are to the non-
parametric one reported above. 
Although it can be difficult to compare studies across different countries 
because of differences in time period, sample construction, and measures of earnings, 
as well as in the details of the models of earnings dynamics used, it is interesting 
nevertheless to try and compare our results to previous studies. In doing so we restrict 
our comparisons where possible to studies that use a similar methodology to the one 
we adopt. Haider (2001) finds that permanent inequality accounts for on average, 
about two-thirds of total variance in the US between 1968-1992. Baker and Solon 
(2003) conduct a similar analysis for Canada from 1976-1992, and find that the 
permanent component fell from about 70% to 64% over that period. Gustavsson’s 
(2007) results indicate that permanent inequality varied between approximately 63-
70% for males aged 40 in Sweden during the 1990s. Cervini and Ramos (2006) find 
that the permanent component for Spain varies substantially by age cohort, but for 
men born from 1954-1963, it rose from about 60% to about 75% between 1993 and 
2001. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) find the permanent component varying from 
about 37% to about 63% over the 1969-1996 period in the US. And Ramos (2003) 
reports a permanent component that averages about 40% during the 1990s in Britain.  
The study that is the most similar to ours is, however, Daly and Valetta 
(2007). As mentioned previously, their parametric analysis implies a permanent 
contribution of 54% for the US, 58% for Germany and 52% for Great Britain over the 
1990’s. Thus our estimate of 71% is at the upper end of the range of previous 
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estimates, and is particularly high in the most relevant comparison.10 These results 
suggest that Ireland suffers from both a high level of overall earnings inequality, and a 
high proportion of that inequality being permanent, suggesting low earnings mobility. 
However, there is no evidence that the rapid growth experienced during this period 
altered the nature of inequality. 
6. Centralized Wage Bargaining and Public and Private Sector Earnings 
The fact that we find no change in the proportion of inequality that is permanent over 
the sample period is somewhat surprising, given the labour market changes in Ireland 
outlined in Section 1. One possible explanation for this result is the highly centralized 
nature of wage bargaining in Ireland. As explained in greater detail below, the way 
wage bargaining is conducted means that it is plausible that any forces acting to 
reduce permanent inequality would be stronger in the private sector than in the public 
sector. Thus, this section carries out a decomposition of inequality separately for these 
two sectors, after first explaining the wage bargaining system. 
Centralized wage bargaining in its current form, known as ‘Social 
Partnership’, was introduced in 198711 and since then, agreements have been 
negotiated every two or three years between employer organisations, trade unions and 
the government to award fixed percentage wage increases to employees at set dates. 
Higher percentage awards are typically made to very low-paid workers. 
Because the wage agreements are specified in terms of percentage increases 
that should be awarded by any given employer, they serve to ‘freeze’ the pre-existing 
                                                 
10 See also Gangl (2005) who uses a different methodology but also concludes that permanent 
inequality is high in Ireland 
11 This was in response to a serious fiscal crisis. Wage restraint was the primary goal in the early years; 
in exchange for low bargained wage increases, the government committed to reducing the income tax 
burden, so that net pay increases could be achieved without damaging competitiveness. 
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wage distribution in place. Thus, if there is some external force encouraging an 
increase in inequality – such as skill-biased technical change or increasing 
international trade – the pay agreement system will indeed reduce inequality below 
what it would otherwise be, as suggested by Gottschalk and Joyce (1998), amongst 
others. However, it is interesting to note that any external force reducing inequality 
would be resisted by the wage bargaining system. 
Moreover, in the absence of job changes, the wage bargaining system would 
freeze not only the overall distribution, but also the position of individuals within that 
distribution. Thus, we expect that the system leads to a higher proportion of 
permanent inequality than would otherwise prevail. 
In practice, however, the agreements may have less ‘bite’ than suggested by 
the above description. Firstly, not all employees are covered, as not all employers are 
aligned with the employers’ organisations. Secondly, employees can move jobs in 
order to escape wage restraint; since negotiated wage increases apply to posts that 
already exist within an organisation, it is open to an employee to move between 
employers and secure a ‘promotion’ through the distribution.  
Thirdly, as the labour market became increasingly tight during the economic 
boom, employers began to give ‘top-up’ wage increases to retain staff. Compliance 
with early wage agreements was reported to be very high, even in the multinational 
sector where employers are typically not affiliated with employers’ organisations, and 
unions are weak. However, by 2000, there were widespread reports of top-ups being 
awarded. It is important to note, however, that public sector employees would have 
been firmly bound by the agreements; as one of the three major players in the 
negotiations of the agreements, the government could not be seen to be breaking its 
own terms, even in the face of labour shortages in some sectors. If top-ups were 
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offered independently of permanent characteristics, this would lead us to expect that 
the proportion of inequality that was permanent would be falling for private sector 
workers, but not for public sector workers, towards the end of the sample period. On 
the other hand, if top-ups were correlated with permanent characteristics, no reduction 
in permanent inequality would be expected. 
The above analysis suggests that the boom may have affected the functioning 
of the private sector labour market, and increasingly so as time went on, but this effect 
may have been obscured by the fact that centralized wage bargaining prevented any 
such effect in the public sector labour market. Thus, in this section, we report results 
of the decomposition of public and private sector earnings inequality into permanent 
and transitory components.  
Tables 4 and 5 give the covariance matrices for public and private sector 
earnings respectively. In constructing these matrices, the sample was initially 
constructed exactly as before – individuals who were missing earnings data for any 
year that they were not either in education or in retirement were excluded, as were 
those outside the 21-65 age range. Earnings in the top and bottom 1% of the full 
sample’s distribution (i.e. public and private sector earnings together) were also 
dropped. It was at this stage that the sample was separated into observations on public 
sector and private sector earnings. At that point, any individual who did not have at 
least two years of earnings in the relevant sector was dropped. It is important to note 
that individuals who moved from one sector to the other and had at least two years of 
recorded earnings in each sector will be present in both samples. Thus, this is an 
analysis of public and private sector earnings, rather than public and private sector 
workers. 
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Looking at the variance-covariance matrix for public sector earnings in Table 
4, its most striking characteristic is how much lower the variances (along the 
diagonal) are than in Table 1, the equivalent table for all workers. There is no obvious 
trend in the variances, which range from 0.127 in 1998 to 0.146 in 2001, with a 
typical value of about 0.139. This compares with a typical value of about 0.187 for all 
workers. In general, however, the same pattern of autocovariances holds as before – 
the biggest drop is in the one-period covariances, with smaller drops – and indeed 
some small rises – thereafter. For the private sector variance-covariance matrix given 
in Table 5, the variances are very similar to those in Table 1, as is the pattern of 
covariances. However, the sharp contrast with Table 4, for public sector earnings, is 
clear. In 1994, the variance of private sector earnings was 0.240, whereas that for 
public sector earnings was 0.145; in 2001, the variances were 0.190 and 0.146 
respectively. Thus, wage dispersion is, unsurprisingly, significantly lower in the 
public sector than in the private sector. 
The non-parametric estimates of the proportion of total inequality that is 
permanent in the two sectors also reveal sharp differences. In the public sector, 81% 
of inequality is estimated to be permanent in 1994, 82% in 1995 and 80% in 1996. In 
contrast, the permanent proportion in the private sector is estimated to be 60% in 
1994, 58% in 1995 and 74% in 1996. Thus, public sector earnings are less dispersed, 
but more persistent than private sector earnings; the distribution is less unequal, but 
once assigned a place in the distribution, it is more difficult to change rank within the 
distribution.  
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We had difficulty estimating the full model outlined in Section 2 when the 
data was split into public and private sectors.12 We did however obtain robust results 
for a restricted version of the model with fewer factor loadings. In particular we allow 
the permanent and transitory variances to change between 1994-1997 and 1998-2001 
but restrict them to be constant within these periods. While this limits our ability to 
identify trends, it does allow us to examine the extent to which the absence of a trend 
in the full sample was driven by the stricter adherence to centralized wage bargaining 
in the public sector. The results are presented in Table 6, where for comparison we 
also present the two factor model for all workers. The estimated proportion of 
variance that is permanent for all workers is 71.3%, which is almost identical to the 
results from the more general eight factor model presented in Section 4. 
Looking at the results for the private and public sector we still find no 
evidence of a significant change in the nature of inequality over the sample period. 
This is not surprising for the public sector. However, the absence of a trend in the 
private sector suggests that the centralized wage bargaining system cannot explain our 
earlier findings. 
We also present the predictions of the permanent proportion for the public and 
private sectors in Tables 7 and 8 respectively. The decomposition of inequality into its 
permanent and transitory component is consistent with the non-parametric results 
above. For the public sector, the permanent component accounts for 78% of the total 
variance on average over the sample period, while the corresponding figure for the 
private sector is 64%. This confirms the view that while inequality is lower in the 
public sector, the wage distributions are much more rigid with little mobility within 
                                                 
12 In particular, some of the parameter estimates, such as ρ, were not robust to changes in starting 
values and seemed to be affected by a small number of moment conditions. 
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the distribution. This would accord with expectations, given that pay progression 
occurs almost exclusively along pre-determined ‘pay scales’ in the public sector. It 
also concurs with conclusions drawn by Postel-Vinay and Turon (2005) and 
Cappellari (2002) about public sector earnings in Britain and Italy respectively. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper extends previous work examining the impact of growth on 
inequality by considering the impact of growth on the nature, rather than the level, of 
inequality. We do this by examining inequality in Ireland for the years 1994-2001. 
Ireland experienced a remarkable boom over this time period, with average annual 
growth rates of 8.5%. Our analysis of the covariance structure of earnings in Ireland 
suggests that the degree of persistence of Irish inequality is high, with permanent 
inequality accounting for about 71% of total inequality. However we find no evidence 
that the underlying nature of inequality in Ireland was greatly affected by the rapid 
growth over this period. Our analysis of the private and public sectors shows that 
although earnings inequality is significantly lower in the public than in the private 
sector, the permanent component is much higher. However, again, we discern no 
significant time trend in the proportion of inequality that is permanent, in either the 
public or private sectors.  
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 Table 1: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals from Regressions of Monthly 
Gross Earnings on Experience, Male Employees. Cell sizes in italics 
           1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001 
1994 
 
.2174 
435 
       
1995 
 
.1748 
432 
.1924 
439 
      
1996 
 
.1541 
426 
.1566 
430 
.1729 
436 
     
1997 
 
.1506 
418 
.1537 
422 
.1560 
426 
.1812 
433 
    
1998 
 
.1414 
408 
.1462 
411 
.1469 
416 
.1532 
419 
.1775 
427 
   
1999 
 
.1465 
404 
.1406 
407 
.1421 
412 
.1475 
416 
.1572 
420 
.1807 
430 
  
2000 
 
.1317 
395 
.1301 
398 
.1320 
403 
.1393 
407 
.1428 
412 
.1467 
421 
.1875 
424 
 
2001 
 
.1372 
392 
.1324 
395 
.1337 
398 
.1417 
403 
.1403 
406 
.1465 
416 
.1555 
418 
.1854 
421 
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates: Monthly Gross Earnings, 21-65 Male Employees  
Parameters Estimate SE 
2
ασ  0.1377 .0166 
ρ 0.6351 .1280 
Factor Loadings – Transitory Shock 
( tλ ) 
  
1994 1  
1995 0.9471 .1153 
1996 0.8144 .1228 
1997 0.8455 .1293 
1998 0.8697 .1395 
1999 0.8646 .1224 
2000 1.0938 .1628 
2001 0.9856 .1588 
Factor Loadings – Permanent Shock 
( tp ) 
  
1994 1  
1995 0.9833 .0382 
1996 0.9791 .0507 
1997 1.0026 .0575 
1998 0.9846 .0708 
1999 0.9941 .0675 
2000 0.9263 .0690 
2001 0.9709 .0683 
2
vσ  0.1121 .0559 
2
εσ  0.0453 .0130 
θ -0.2298 .1038 
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Table 3: Trends in Permanent and Transitory Inequality in Ireland 1994-2001 
Male Employees Age 21-65 
 
Year Actual  
Variance 
Predicted 
Variance 
Transitory 
Inequality 
Persistent 
Inequality 
Proportion of 
inequality due to 
Permanent 
component  
1994 .2175 .2174 .0797 .1377 .6334 
1995 .1924 .1930 .0598 .1332 .6902 
1996 .1729 .1727 .0407 .1320 .7643 
1997 .1812 .1808 .0424 .1385 .7657 
1998 .1775 .1777 .0442 .1335 .7514 
1999 .1807 .1795 .0434 .1361 .7582 
2000 .1875 .1875 .0693 .1182 .6304 
2001 .1854 .1860 .0562 .1298 .6979 
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Table 4: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals from Regressions of Monthly 
Gross Public Sector Earnings on Experience, Males 21-65. Cell sizes in italics 
 
           1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001 
1994 
 
.1452 
208 
       
1995 
 
.1258 
205 
.1441 
209 
      
1996 
 
.1179 
202 
.1251 
205 
.1296 
209 
     
1997 
 
.1123 
183 
.1165 
185 
.1115 
189 
.1376 
195 
    
1998 
 
.1130 
177 
.1166 
178 
.1103 
180 
.1142 
178 
.1268 
188 
   
1999 
 
.1182 
167 
.1181 
169 
.1092 
171 
.1156 
169 
.1224 
173 
.1411 
183 
  
2000 
 
.1157 
158 
.1188 
158 
.1128 
160 
.1179 
158 
.1155 
164 
.1149 
164 
.1406 
171 
 
2001 
 
.1089 
162 
.1064 
162 
.1036 
165 
.1092 
165 
.1069 
167 
.1104 
169 
.1182 
165 
.1460 
179 
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Table 5: Variance-Covariance Matrix of Residuals from Regression of Monthly 
Gross Private Sector  Earnings on Experience, Males 21-65. Cell sizes in italics 
           1994     1995     1996     1997     1998     1999     2000     2001 
1994 
 
.2396 
225 
       
1995 
 
.1808 
221 
.1958 
229 
      
1996 
 
.1564 
216 
.1518 
221 
.1813 
226 
     
1997 
 
.1454 
212 
.1451 
215 
.1596 
218 
.1887 
233 
    
1998 
 
.1372 
207 
.1422 
211 
.1545 
213 
.1621 
222 
.1870 
235 
   
1999 
 
.1446 
204 
.1345 
209 
.1500 
211 
.1524 
220 
.1604 
225 
.1924 
242 
  
2000 
 
.1148 
202 
.1142 
206 
.1262 
206 
.1386 
217 
.1475 
222 
.1580 
234 
.2040 
246 
 
2001 
 
.1315 
200 
.1190 
203 
.1337 
204 
.1412 
214 
.1454 
216 
.1591 
227 
.1614 
230 
.1898 
236 
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates: Monthly Gross Earnings, Public and Private 
Sector and All Employees, Males 21-65. Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
Parameters All Public Private 
2
ασ  0.1338 
(.0140) 
.1083 
(.0183) 
.1178 
(.0208) 
ρ 0.5952 
(.1244) 
.6945 
(.3765) 
.6092 
(.1249) 
Factor Loadings – Transitory 
Shock ( tλ ) 
   
1λ 1994-1998 1 1 1 
2λ 1996-1997 1.1065 
(.0846) 
1.1121 
(.1378) 
.9907 
(.0923) 
Factor Loadings – Permanent 
Shock ( tp ) 
   
1p 1994-1995 1 1 1 
2p 1996-1997 .9925 
(.0371) 
1.0016 
(.0500) 
1.0569 
(.0657) 
2
vσ  0.1570 
(.0502) 
0.0547 
(.0267) 
0.2082 
(.0679) 
2
εσ  0.0338 
(.0040) 
.0220 
(.0053) 
.0453 
(.0057) 
θ -0.2140 
(.1381) 
  -.4812 
(.3340) 
  -.1220 
(.1543) 
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Table 7: Trends in Permanent and Transitory Inequality in Ireland 1994-2001 
Public Sector Earnings, Male Employees 21-65 2 factor model 
 
Year Actual  
Variance 
Predicted 
Variance 
Transitory 
Inequality 
Persistent 
Inequality 
Proportion of 
inequality due to 
Permanent 
component  
1994 .1452 .1471 .0388 .1083 .7365 
1995 .1441 .1394 .0311 .1083 .7771 
1996 .1296 .1357 .0274 .1083 .7984 
1997 .1376 .1339 .0256 .1083 .8090 
1998 .1268 .1392 .0306 .1087 .7805 
1999 .1411 .1387 .0300 .1087 .7834 
2000 .1406 .1385 .0298 .1087 .7848 
2001 .1460 .1384 .0297 .1087 .7855 
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Table 8: Trends in Permanent and Transitory Inequality in Ireland 1994-2001 
Private Sector Earnings, Males 21-65 
Year Actual  
Variance 
Predicted 
Variance 
Transitory 
Inequality 
Persistent 
Inequality 
Proportion of 
inequality due to 
Permanent 
component  
1994 .2396 .2343 .1166 .1178 .5026 
1995 .1958 .2003 .0825 .1178 .5879 
1996 .1813 .1877 .0699 .1178 .6275 
1997 .1887 .1830 .0652 .1178 .6436 
1998 .1870 .1939 .0623 .1316 .6786 
1999 .1924 .1933 .0617 .1316 .6808 
2000 .2040 .1930 .0615 .0316 .6816 
2001 .1898 .1929 .0614 .0316 .6819 
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Figure 1. Unemployment Rates in Ireland (%), 1983-2008. 
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Figure 2. Earnings Inequality for Males aged 21-65, Unbalanced Sample and 
Revolving Balanced Panel Sample. 
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Figure 3. Decomposition of Earnings Inequality Males aged 21-65. 
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